Exercise set 11

TMA4160 Cryptography

4. November 2014

In the lectures we have defined a Σ -protocol in the following way. Let $R = \{(h; a)\} \subseteq X \times Y$ be a binary relation, and let $L_R = \{h \in X | \exists a \in Y \text{ s.t. } (h; a) \in R\}$ be the language relating to R. Then we define a Σ -protocol as

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \mathbf{P} & - & \mathbf{V} \\ \text{Input:} & \text{Input:} \\ (h; a) \in R & h \in X \\ \alpha \leftarrow A_1(h, a) & & \\ & \stackrel{\alpha}{\to} & \\ & e \in_R C \\ r \rightarrow A_2(h, a, e) & \stackrel{e}{\leftarrow} & \\ & & A_3(h, \alpha, e, r)? \end{array}$$

Fig. 1. Σ -protocol for relation R, where A_1 and A_2 are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, C is a finite set and A_3 is a polynomial time predicate.

Definition 1. A Σ -protocol for relation R is a protocol between is a protocol between a prover P and a verifier V of the the form given in figure 1 satisfying the following three properties.

Completeness. If P and V follow the protocol, then V always accepts.

Special soundness. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm E which given any $h \in X$ and any pair of accepting conversations (α, e_1, r_1) and (α, e_2, r_2) , with $e_1 \neq e_2$, computes a witness a satisfying $(h, a) \in R$.

Special honest-verifier zero-knowledge. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm S which given any $h \in L_R$ and any challenge $e \in C$ produces conversations (α, e, r) with the same probability distribution as conversations between honest P and V on common input h and challenge e, where P uses any witness a satisfying $(h, a) \in R$. Furthermore, for $h \in X \setminus L_R$, S is just required to produce arbitrary accepting conversations with challenge e.

Exercise 1

Consider the following version of the Schnorr protocol:




Fig. 2. Insecure version of Schnorr's protocol

a) Show that this version of the Schnorr protocol is a Σ -protocol

b) Show that this version of the Schnorr protocol is completly insecure against a cheating verifier, and suggest a fix.

Exercise 2

Let n = pq be a RSA-modulus, and b a large prime (So that O(b) is exponential in the size of n). Consider the Guillou-Quisquter protocol for showing knowledge of bth-roots (i.e knowledge of m such that $m^b = c$ for public c):




Fig. 3. The Guillou-Quisqater protocol

Show that the Guillou-Quisquter protocol is a Σ -protocol

Challenge

Exercise 3

You have seen in the lectures how to use Schnorr's protocol to create a protocol for the relation $\{(h_1, h_2; a_1, a_2) \mid h_1 = g^{a_1} \land h_2 = g^{a_2}\}$ (AND-protocol). Now use Guillou-Quisquer's protocol to create a protocol for the relation $\{(c_1, c_2; m_1, m_2) \mid c_1 = m_1^b \land c_2 = m_2^b\}$.